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The following is draft work (notes and bibliography not included) from one of my books in 
progress tentatively titled Against the Cultural Singularity: Digital Humanities & Critical 
Infrastructure Studies. Excerpted are a few portions from the beginning of the manuscript that 
bear on the critical potential of the digital humanities and critique. I was prompted to post this 
material (on my blog on 2 May 2016) in response an essay in the Los Angeles Review of Books 
the day before.  See also the Storify of my Twitter responses at the time ("Digital Humanities 
and 'Critique'"). 
For a talk including this material as well as additional excerpts from my book in progress, see 
the video recording of my contribution to the Workshop on “Frontiers of DH: Humanities 
Systems Infrastructure,” University of Canterbury, 12 November 2015 (delivered as part of a 
series in New Zealand during my Fulbright Specialist residency at U. Canterbury, October-
November, 2015.) 
2 May 2016 
My aim in this book is to make a strategic intervention in the development of the digital 
humanities.  Following up on my 2012 essay, “Where is Cultural Criticism in the Digital 
Humanities?”, I call for digital humanities research and development informed by, and able to 
influence, the way scholarship, teaching, administration, support services, labor practices, and 
even development and investment strategies in higher education intersect with society, where a 
significant channel of the intersection between the academy and other social sectors, at once 
symbolic and instrumental, consists in shared but contested information-technology 
infrastructures.  I first lay out in the book a methodological framework for understanding how 
the digital humanities can develop a mode of critical infrastructure studies.  I then offer a 
prospectus for the kinds of infrastructure (not only research “cyberinfrastructures,” as they have 
been called) whose development the digital humanities might help create or guide.  And I close 
with thoughts on how the digital humanities can contribute to ameliorating the very idea of 
“development”–technological, socioeconomic, and cultural–today. 
Method (1) 
The first step–framing for the digital humanities a suitable methodological framework for 
critical digital infrastructure studies–is challenging, given that the digital humanities are 
maturing after the late twentieth-century bloom of humanities “theory” and “cultural criticism,” 
which I here group together (grosso modo) under the name “critique.”  The late-comer status of 
the digital humanities in this regard is epitomized in the field’s debate a few years ago about 
“hack versus yack.”  Should digital humanists primarily program, build, or make (hack)?  Or 
should they instead critically interpret and theorize information media, past and present, in a 
manner much like normative humanities research (yack)?  At core, the debate is not really about 
theorized critique versus something other than such critique.  Instead, the debate situates the 
digital humanities at a fork between two branches of late humanities critique.  One, a hack 
branch (sometimes referred to as “critical making”), affiliates with, but is often more concretely 
pragmatic, than “thing theory,” the new materialism, actor-network theory, assemblage theory, 
and similar late poststructuralist theories.  The other, a yack branch, descends from the not 
unrelated critical traditions of Frankfurt School “critical theory,” deconstruction, Foucauldian 
“archaeology,” cultural materialism, postcolonial theory, and gender and race theory–especially 
as all these have now been inflected by media studies. 
In short, the question is not whether the digital humanities should include theorized critique.  At 
some level, and especially in some branches, the field already does by virtue simply of 
belonging to the family of the contemporary humanities.  Instead, the question is what sort of 
critique is uniquely appropriate and purposive for the digital humanities.  What critique, in other 
words, not only allows the field to assist mainstream humanities critique but could not be 
conducted except through digital humanities methods that use technology self-reflexively as 
part of the very condition, and not just facility, of critically knowing and acting on culture 
today? 
The answer to this question, I suggest, is critique at the level of, and articulated through, 
infrastructure–where “infrastructure,” the social-cum-technological milieu that at once enables 
the fulfillment of human experience and enforces constraints on that experience, today has 
much of the same scale, complexity, and general cultural impact as the idea of “culture” 
itself.  Indeed, it may be that in late modernity when the bulk of life and work occurs in 
organizational institutions of one kind or another, the experience of infrastructure at institutional 
scales (undergirded by national or regional infrastructures such as electricity grids and global-
scale infrastructures such as the Internet) is operationally the experience of “culture.”  Put 
another way, the word “infrastructure” can now give us the same kind of general purchase on 
social complexity that Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, and others sought when they reached for 
their all-purpose word, “culture.”  Consider the way dystopian films produced at the onset of the 
digital information age such as Blade Runner (1982) and the Mad Max films (beginning in 
1979) characterized whole cultures by foregrounding infrastructure–in the former: glistening, 
noir cityscapes defined by transportation and media technology; in the latter: desert landscapes 
defined by fuel and water supply systems. Those films gave a foretaste of the way late-modern 
infrastructure is increasingly the mise-en-scène of culture.  Daily life steeps us in pervasive 
encounters with transportation, media, and other infrastructures that do not just neutrally convey 
the experience of culture but are visibly parts of our cultural experience. Late modernity is thus 
car culture, cable TV culture, Internet culture, smartphone culture, and any other kind of “cool” 
culture where, as I studied in my Laws of Cool, “cool” is a cultural affect of both “smart” 
technologies and the knowledge workers who use them to be, or at least look, smart. 
The consequence of such convergence between infrastructure and culture for critique may be 
predicted as follows: especially in the digital humanities, critique must now begin to focus on 
infrastructure in order to have any hope of creating tomorrow’s equivalents of the great cultural-
critical statements of the past. Tomorrow’s E. P. Thompson writing about the making of the 
working class, C. Wright Mills about white collars, Raymond Williams about culture and 
society, Michel Foucault about discipline, Judith Butler about gender and performativity, Donna 
Haraway about cyborgs, or Homi Bhaba about hybridity–among many more who could be 
cited–will need to include in their critiques attention to infrastructure as that cyborg being 
whose making, working, disciplining, performance, gender formation, and hybridity are 
increasingly part of the core identity of late modern culture. 
What would the method for such a digital humanities cultural criticism focused on infrastructure 
actually look like? [material elided here]  . . . [P]rosaically, the style of digital humanities 
infrastructural critique I imagine–one that takes advantage of modes of thinking already 
prevalent in the field–may be called lightly-antifoundationalist.  The question that I concoct this 
phrase to answer is how much antifoundationalism–or, perhaps “anti-groundwork” (to allude to 
Marx’s Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie)–is actually useful for critical 
infrastructure studies.  Mainstream humanistic critique (the “hermeneutics of suspicion” that 
Rita Felski has recently taken to task in her critique of critique) has often been 
antifoundationalist all the way down according to a three-stage logic that might be outlined as 
follows. 
In its first logical moment, critique recognizes that the “real,” “true,” or “lawful” groundwork 
(i.e., infrastructure) for anything, especially the things that matter most to people, such as the 
allocation of goods or the assignation of identity, is ungrounded.  For example, while there are 
material reasons for resource allocation and the social relations of force needed to do that dirty 
deed–i.e., for political economy and society–any particular political economy and society are 
arbitrary and, in the last analysis, unjust.  Political economy and society are thus not grounds 
but, to play on the word, precisely groundworks: particular ways of working the ground (i.e., a 
mode of production) supported by discursive, epistemic, psychic, and cultural institutions for 
ensuring that the work continues in the absence of rational or moral foundation. 
In its second logical moment, critique then goes antifoundationalist to the second degree by 
criticizing its own standing in the political-economic system–a recursion effect attested in now 
familiar, post-May-1968 worries that critics themselves are complicit in elitism, 
“embourgeoisment,” “recuperation,” “containment,” and majoritarian identity, not to mention 
tenure. 
Finally, in its third logical moment, critique seeks to turn its complicity to advantage–for 
example, by positioning critics as what Foucault called embedded or “specific intellectuals” 
acting on a particular institutional scene to steer social forces.  A related idea is to go “tactical” 
in the manner theorized by Michel de Certeau, who argued that people immured in any system 
can appropriate that system’s infrastructure through bottom-up agency for deviant purposes (as 
in his paradigm of jaywalking in the city).  Media critics, including new media critics, have 
generalized de Certeau’s notion in the name of “tactical media,” meaning media whose 
platforms, channels, interfaces, and representations can be appropriated by users for alternative 
ends. 
In general, the digital humanities tend to do things according to methods that slice out from the 
above total arc of critique just the latter tactical moment.  Such slicing–hacking critique to 
severe its roots from purist antifoundationalism–brings digital humanities critique into the orbit 
of several late- or post-critical approaches with a similar style (style rather than full-blown 
theory precisely because they eschew foundational purity).  One approach that James Smithies 
has associated with the digital humanities is “postfoundationalism” in his “Digital Humanities, 
Postfoundationalism, Postindustrial Culture.”  Borrowing from the philosopher of science 
Dimitri Ginev, Smithies argues that postfoundationalism is “an intellectual position that 
balances a distrust of grand narrative with an acceptance that methods honed over centuries and 
supported by independently verified evidence can lead, if not to Truth itself, then closer to it 
than we were before” (¶ 26).  Postfoundationalism is thus well matched to the digital 
humanities, Smithies suggests, if we think of the digital humanities as “a process of continuous 
methodological and . . . theoretical refinement that produces research outputs as snapshots of an 
ongoing activity rather than the culmination of ‘completed’ research” (¶ 29).  A related idea is 
“critical technical practice,” which Michael Dieter (“The Virtues of Critical Digital Practice”)–
building on Philip Agre’s writings on artificial intelligence research–makes a goal of the digital 
humanities.  Dieter quotes from Agre: “The word ‘critical’ here does not call for pessimism and 
destruction but rather for an expanded understanding of the conditions and goals of technical 
work. . . .  Instead of seeking foundations it would embrace the impossibility of foundations, 
guiding itself by a continually unfolding awareness of its own workings as a historically specific 
practice.”  Other ideas that are lightly-foundationalist in this way, though not to my knowledge 
yet applied to the digital humanities, include Bruno Latour’s “compositionism” (fixed on 
neither absolute foundations of knowledge nor absolutist refutations of such foundations but 
instead on mixed, impure, make-do, and can-do compositions of multiple positions; “An 
Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto’,” PDF) and Ackbar Abbas and David Theo Goldberg’s 
“poor theory” (which uses “tools at hand” and “limited resources” to engage “with 
heterogeneous probings, fragmentary thinking, and open-endedness” in resistance to 
“totalization, restriction, and closure”) (“Poor Theory: Notes Toward a Manifesto”, PDF). 
All these lightly-antifoundationalist approaches are tactical rather than strategically pure 
because their very potential for critique arises from polluting proximity to, and sometimes even 
partnership with, their objects of critique.  Unlike distantiated critique, that is, tactical critique 
(as the root of the word “tactic” might indicate) makes contact.  Smithies thus notes 
postfoundationalism’s function as a “bridging concept” for the “interdependence” and 
“entanglement” of the digital humanities with postindustrialism (¶ 8, 3, 2).  Indeed, I add that all 
the approaches thus far mentioned as a “light foundation” for critical infrastructure studies are 
similarly contaminated by the double principle of efficiency and flexibility, which (as I 
articulated in my The Laws of Cool) is the two-stroke engine of the postindustrial mode of 
production.  As it were, all the approaches I have mentioned are instances of “lean” and “just-
in-time” critique and thus not dissimilar in spirit to the in-house critique that postindustrial 
corporations at the end of the twentieth century began to design into their own production lines 
by famously empowering workers to “stop the line” ad hoc (or, less catastrophically, to suggest 
incremental improvements) when they saw something wrong.  Such dirty contact with 
postindustrialism is both the weakness and strength of lightly-antifoundationalist approaches, 
where weakness means being swallowed up by the system and strength comes from getting 
close enough to the system to know its critical points of inflection, difference, and change.  If, 
as Smithies says, the digital humanities are “deeply entangled” in postindustrialism, in other 
words, entanglement need not be the same as equivalence.  It is also engagement. 
The critical potential of this tendency in the digital humanities to be lightly-antifoundationalist 
can now be stated: it is precisely the ability to treat infrastructure not as a foundation, a given, 
but instead as a tactical medium that opens the possibility of critical infrastructure studies as a 
mode of cultural studies.  And it is such cultural studies that will allow the digital humanities to 
fulfill their final-cause critical function at the present time, which is to help adjudicate how 
academic infrastructure connects higher education to, but also differentiates it from, the 
workings of other institutions in advanced technological societies.  The critical function of the 
digital humanities going forward, in other words, is to assist in shaping smart, ethical academic 
infrastructures that not only further normative academic work (research, pedagogy, advising, 
administration, etc.) but also intelligently transfer some, but not all, values and practices in both 
directions between higher education and today’s other powerful institutions–business, law, 
medicine, government, the media, the creative industries, NGOs, and so on. 
Method (2) 
At present, some of the most influential general understandings of infrastructure cited by digital 
humanists such as Sheila Anderson and James Smithies studying humanities cyberinfrastructure 
in particular have been the Large Technical Systems (LTS) approach, stemming originally from 
the historian Thomas Hughes’s Networks of Power (1983), and the information-ethnography 
approach stemming from Susan Leigh Star, Geoffrey Bowker, and their circle. Good 
expositions of both are combined in one of the best conceptualizations of infrastructure I have 
so far found: a document of 2007 titled “Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and 
Design” (PDF) (whose authors include Bowker) representing the final report to the National 
Science Foundation of a workshop it sponsored. 
Adding to these general approaches to infrastructure, I borrow in this book another portfolio of 
thought that to my knowledge has not yet been introduced directly to infrastructure studies. It is 
also a portfolio largely unknown in the digital humanities and, for that matter, in the humanities 
as a whole even though it is broadly compatible with humanities cultural criticism.  The 
portfolio consists of the “neoinstitutionalist” approach to organizations in sociology and, highly 
consonant, also “social constructionist” (especially “adaptive structuration”) approaches to 
organizational infrastructure in sociology and information science.  Taken together, these 
approaches explore how organizations are structured as social institutions by so-called 
“carriers” of beliefs and practices (i.e., culture), among which information-technology 
infrastructure is increasingly crucial.  Importantly, these approaches are a social-science version 
of what I have called lightly-antifoundationalist.  Scholars in these areas “see through” the 
supposed rationality of organizations and their supporting infrastructures to the fact that they are 
indeed social institutions with all the irrationality that implies.  But they are less interested in 
exposing the ungrounded nature of organizational institutions and infrastructures (as if it were 
possible to avoid or get outside them) than in illuminating, and pragmatically guiding, the 
agencies and factors involved in their making and remaking.  Such approaches are thus 
inherently a good match for the epistemology of building, unbuilding, and rebuilding in the 
digital humanities. 
More than a good match, neoinstitutionalism and the social science of organizational 
technologies offer exactly the right tactical opening for a digital humanities cultural criticism 
because they are all about the site on which the already existing critical force of the digital 
humanities is pent up: institutional forms of technologically-assisted knowledge work.  After 
all, the digital humanities stand in contrast to new media studies and network critique among 
cousin fields as the branch of digitally-focused humanities work that has been primarily focused 
on changing research, authorship, dissemination, and teaching inside (and across) academic 
institutions and related cultural or heritage institutions rather than on broader commentary 
directed externally at society and social justice.  The digital humanities are all about developing 
analytical, publishing, curatorial, and hybrid-pedagogical tools and practices at scales ranging 
from standalone projects to federated or regional frameworks; creating new university programs 
and centers; changing the accepted notion of academic careers (e.g., to include “alt-ac” 
alternative academic careers); and, ultimately, instilling a new scholarly digital ethos in the 
academy in the name of “collaboration” and “open access.”  As a consequence, the existing 
critical energy of the digital humanities–sometimes quite passionate and even militant–has been 
primarily devoted to such institutional issues.  Breaking down the paywalls of closed 
publication infrastructures, for instance, is the digital humanities version of storming a 
university administration building in the 1970s. 
Can neoinstitutional and social-structuration-of-technology approaches to understanding the 
evolving relation between the academic institution and today’s more domineering institutions 
(most notably, business and government) help the digital humanities release its intramural 
critical energy?  Can that release help propel not just change in higher education but, through 
higher education and the technological infrastructures that mediate its relationship to other 
institutions, also extramural change in the larger society that higher ed contributes to?  (Besides 
its focus on culture, I note, one of the special strengths of neoinstitutionalism that make it 
attractive to add it to Large Technical System analyses of infrastructure is that it is especially 
attuned to studying change and divergence among dominant institutional systems.)  In short, can 
the considerable existing intelligence, idealism, and moral force of the digital humanities be 
redirected from being only an instrument of institution work to becoming through interventions 
in instrumental infrastructure also a way to act on institutions and their wider social impact? 
But I do not wish to overreach, which is also why I think an approach focused on institutions 
and their infrastructures is particularly appropriate.  Ultimately, the digital humanities field must 
be critical in a way that does not ask it inauthentically to reach beyond its expertise and mandate 
to bear exaggerated responsibility for larger social phenomena.  Acting out through the digital 
humanities about larger social issues is necessary.  But such actions must be complemented by 
creating infrastructures and practices that make their social impact by being what Susan Leigh 
Star called “boundary objects”–in this case boundary objects situated between the academic 
institution and other major social institutions.  It is in this boundary zone–just as one example, 
“content management system” infrastructures whose use by scholars oscillates between 
corporate “managed” and “open community” philosophies–that higher education can most 
pertinently influence, and be influenced by, other institutions through what I earlier called 
“shared but contested information-technology infrastructures.”  It is in this boundary zone of 
hybrid scholarly, pedagogical, and administrative institutional infrastructure that we need the 
attention of skilled and thoughtful digital humanists, even if the interventions they make are not 
called anything as ambitious as “activism” but instead simply “building.” 
[End of excerpt]  
  
 
